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ABSTRACT
It is often argued that tax competition may lead to a "race to the bottom". Such a race may hold indeed
in the case of the pure case of factor mobility (such as capital mobility). However, in this paper we
emphasize the unique feature of labor migration, that may nullify the "race to the bottom" hypothesis.
Labor migration is governed by net-of-tax factor rewards and the benefits that the welfare state provides.
Tax rates are determined in a political economy set up which takes into account the effect of taxes
and migration on factor rewards and the fiscal burden imposed by migration on the decisive voter.
The paper models the host country stylistically as a member of the core of an economic union (i.e.,
a core EU welfare state member state), with tax financed benefits which is able to control the volume
and the skill-composition of migration. The source country is modeled as an accession country to an
economic union (i.e., through the EU enlargement treaty), with its own welfare (tax-benefit) policy.
We let these two countries engage in fiscal competition. Using numerical simulations we examine
how the migration policies are affected by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. We also
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sadka@post.tau.ac.ilWe address the issue of wether tax competition lead to a "race to the bot-
tom". In a basic tax-competition model competition may lead to such
a downward race because of three mutually reinforcing factors. First,
in order to attract mobile factors or prevent their ￿ ight, tax rates on
them are reduced. Second, the ￿ ight of mobile factors from the rela-
tively high tax to the relatively low tax countries shrinks the tax base
in the relatively high tax country. Third, the ￿ ight of the mobile factors
from the relatively high tax country is presumed to reduce the remuner-
ation of the immobile factors, and, consequently, their contribution to
the tax revenue 1. In contrast, in our model the mobile factor is labor
of various skills. These factors consider not only their economic returns
when making their migration decision, but rather also the social bene-
￿ts o⁄ered by the countries. Importantly, also, the decisive voter who
determine the tax rates is concerned about the e⁄ect of migration on
factor rewards and ￿scal burden. The paper analyzes ￿scal competition
with and without migration in a two-country, political-economy, model
with labor of di⁄erent skills. The paper assigns an active ￿scal role for
both the host and the source countries in shaping policies concerning
the generosity of the welfare state. It models a migration host country
stylistically as a member of the core EU welfare state, with tax ￿nanced
bene￿ts, and political - economy based immigration policies. The source
country is modelled as an accession EU country (in the EU enlargement
to 27 states), with its own welfare state (tax-bene￿t) policy 2. The two
countries are identical except that the total factor productivity in the
host country is assumed to be higher than that of the source country.
The productivity gap is indeed the driving force behind migration. We
let the host and the source country engage in ￿scal competition. Using
numerical simulations we examine how the migration and tax policies
are shaped. That is, how they are di⁄erent according to whether the
skilled, or the unskilled, are in power. We also analyze hoe tax policies
di⁄er between the regime of free migration and the regime of controlled
migration.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reports some
background empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the analytical frame-
work. Simulation results are reported in section 4. Section 5 analyzes
free vs. controlled migration. Section 6 concludes.
1For a general-equilibrium ￿scal-competion model of Europe, with capital mobil-
ity, see Mendoza and Tesar (2005). The paper demonstrates the limitation of the
race-to-the-bottom result when factor rewards are variable.
2Recall that a grace period between 2004 and 2014 exists where an EU-15 member
state can regulate the immigration ￿ ows from the accession countries. Thus, in the
interim period national policies are allowed for inter-EU migration.
22 Evidence on the Fiscal Burden of Migration
It is worthwhile to review some evidence on the ￿scal aspects of migration
and on native born attitudes toward immigration, before we develop the
tax competition model.
In 1997 the U.S. National Research Council sponsored a study on the
overall ￿scal impact of immigration into the U.S.; see Edmonston and
Smith (1997). The study looks comprehensibly at all layers of govern-
ment (federal, state, and local), all programs (bene￿ts), and all types of
taxes. For each cohort, de￿ned by age of arrival to the U.S., the bene￿ts
(cash or in kind) received by migrants over their own lifetimes and the
lifetimes of their ￿rst-generation descendents were projected. These ben-
e￿ts include Medicare, Medicaid, Supplementary Security Income (SSI),
Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), etc. Similarly, taxes
paid directly by migrants and the incidence on migrants of other taxes
(such as corporate taxes) were also projected for the lifetimes of the
migrants and their ￿rst-generation descendents. Accordingly, the net
￿scal burden was projected and discounted to the present. In this way,
the net ￿scal burden for each age cohort of migrants was calculated in
present value terms. Within each age cohort, these calculations were dis-
aggregated according to three educational levels: Less than high school
education, high school education, and more than high school education.
Indeed the ￿ndings suggest that migrants with less than high school
education are typically a net ￿scal burden that can reach as high as
approximately US-$100,000 in present value, when the migrants￿age on
arrival is between 20￿ 30 years. See also the related analysis of Auerbach
and Oreopoulos(1999).
Following the recent enlargement of the European Union to 27 coun-
tries, only three members of the EU-15 (the UK, Sweden and Ireland)
allowed free access for residents of the accession countries to their na-
tional labor markets, in the year of the ￿rst enlargement, 2004. The
other members of the EU-15 took advantage of the clause that allows
for restricted labor markets for a transitional period of up to seven years.
Focusing on the UK and the A8 countries3, Dustmann at al (2009) bring
evidence of no welfare migration. The average age of the A8 migrants
during the period 20044-2008 is 25.8 years, considerably lower than the
native U.K. average age (38.7 years). The A8 migrants are also better
educated than the native-born. For instance, the percentage of those
3The A8 countries are the ￿rst eight accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Poland.)
4More accurately, the said period extends from the second quarter of 2004 through
the ￿rst quarter of 2009.
3that left full-time education at the age of 21 years or later is 35.5 among
the A8 migrants, compared to only 17.1 among the U.K. natives. An-
other indication that the migration is not predominantly driven by wel-
fare motives is the higher employment rate of the A8 migrants (83.1%)
relative to the U.K. natives (78.9%). Furthermore, for the same pe-
riod, the contribution of the A8 migrants to government revenues far ex-
ceeded the government expenditures attributed to them. A recent study
by Barbone et al (2009), based on the 2006 European Union Survey
of Income and Living conditions, ￿nds that migrants from the acces-
sion countries constitute only 1-2 percent of the total population in the
pre-enlargement EU countries (excluding Germany and Luxemburg); by
comparison, about 6 percent of the population in the latter EU countries
were born outside the enlarged EU. The small share of migrants from the
accession countries is, of course, not surprising in view of the restrictions
imposed on migration from the accession countries to the EU-15 before
the enlargement and during the transition period after the enlargement.
The study shows also that there is, as expected, a positive correlation
between the net current taxes (that is, taxes paid less bene￿ts received)
of migrants from all source countries and their education level5.
Hanmeueller and Hiscox (2010), using survey data in the US, ￿nd
two critical economic concerns that appear to generate anti-immigrant
sentiments among voters: concerns about labor-market competition, and
concerns about the ￿scal burden on public services. Not unexpectedly,
employing opinion surveys, Hanson et al (2007) bring evidence that in
the United States native residents of states which provide generous ben-
e￿ts to migrants also prefer to reduce the number of migrants. Fur-
thermore, the opposition is stronger among higher income groups. Sim-
ilarly, Hanson et al (2009), again employing opinion surveys, ￿nd for
the United States that native-born residents of states with a high share
of unskilled migrants, among the migrants population, prefer to restrict
in migration; whereas native-born residents of states with a high share
of skilled migrants among the migrant population are less likely to fa-
vor restricting migration6. Indeed, developed economies do attempt to
sort out immigrants by skills (see, for instance, Bhagwati and Gordon
(2009)). Australia and Canada employ a point system based on se-
lected immigrants￿characteristics. The U.S. employs explicit preference
for professional, technical and kindred immigrants under the so-called
third-preference quota. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009) ￿nd that both the
Australian and American selection mechanisms are e⁄ective in sorting
out the skilled migrants, and produce essentially similar outcomes de-
5See also Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002)
6See also Mayda (2006)
4spite of their di⁄erent legal characteristics.
3 The Analytical Framework
We now develop a two-country model based on political-economy deter-
mination of migration policies and the generosity of the welfare state7.
3.1 The Host-Country Economy






  0  ￿  1 (1)
where,  is GDP,  denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter, and
 denotes the input of labor of skill level , where  =  for skilled
and unskilled, respectively.
The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are, respectively
 = ￿ (2)
 = (1 ¬ ￿)
Note that the abundancy of skilled labor raises the wage of the un-
skilled, and the abundancy of unskilled labor raises the wage of the
skilled.
Aggregate labor supply, for skilled and unskilled workers, respec-
tively, is given by:
 = ( + ￿￿) (3)
 = (1 ¬  + (1 ¬ ￿)￿)
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native-born is
normalized to 1;  denotes the share of native born skilled in the total
native-born labor supply; ￿ denotes the share of skilled migrants in the
total number of migrants; ￿ denotes the total number of migrants; and
 is the labor supply of an individual with skill level  2 fg
Total population (native born and migrants) is as follows
 = 1 + ￿: (4)
7See Cohen and Razin (2008) and Cohen, Razin and Sadka (2009) who analyze
the interactions between redistribution policies and migration policies using a similar
analytical framework.
8The parsimonious model is developed with the cross-section data is mind. The
migration variable is the stock of migrants; not ￿ ows (as relevant for dynamic analy-
sis).
5We specify a simple welfare-state system which levies a proportional
labor income tax at the rate ￿, with the revenues redistributed equally
to all residents (native born and migrants alike) as a demogrant,  per
capita. The demogrant captures not only a cash transfer but also outlays
on public services such as education, health, and other provisions, that
bene￿t all workers, regardless of their contribution to the ￿nances of the
system.
The government budget constraint is therefore
 = ￿ (5)
Note that we assume that migrants are fully entitled to the welfare
state system. That is, the pay the tax rate ￿ and receive the bene￿t b.
The utility function for skill-type  2 fg is






 + ln() (6)
where  denotes consumption of an individual with skill level , and
  0, in the labor supply elasticity. Note that we interpet b not just
as a pure cash transfer, but rather as some public service that renders a
utility of ln(b)9.
The budget constraint of an individual with skill level  is
 = (1 ¬ ￿) (7)
Individual utility-maximization yields the following the labor supply
equation
 = ((1 ¬ ￿))
  (8)
The indirect utility function of an individual of skill level  2 fg
is given by





It is then straightforward to calculate the equilibrium wages for the













9Note that this interpretation of b is also called for in order to ensure that every-
one, including the rich, opts for some positive level of b and is willing to support
some taxation
6where ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (1 ¬ ￿)
1¬￿ and ￿ ￿
1¬+(1¬￿)￿
+￿￿
In order to ensure that the skilled wage always exceeds the unskilled
wage,   , we assume that
￿(1 ¬  + (1 ¬ ￿)￿)
(1 ¬ ￿)( + ￿￿)
 1 (11)

3.2 The Source-Country Economy
To simplify, we assume that the economies of the source country and
the host country are identical, except for a higher productivity factor
in the host country (e.g., all the other technology and preference para-
meters are identical). Also, each resident of the source country has an
individual-speci￿c cost of migration. This cost (denoted by ￿ and mea-
sured in utility terms) varies across individuals as in section 2.3.1 due
to individual characteristics such as age, family size, forms of portable
pensions, etc. For each skill group (their total size normalized to one) ￿
is distributed uniformly over the interval [0￿]. Throughout an asterisk
(￿) denotes the source country variables.
The description of the source country economy is similar to that of
the host country economy. Production is as in equation (1), except for







where ￿  . The competitive wage rates are given by equation (2)
with asterisks attached to the variables. The aggregate labor supplies
in the source country are di⁄erent than in the host because the former
is "sending" what the latter is "receiving":

￿





 = (1 ¬  ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)￿)
￿

Note that we assume the same pre-migration skill composition in the
two countries.
Total population in the source country is

￿ = 1 ¬ ￿: (14)
The utility function of source country residents is given by equation
(2), with asterisks attached to the variables.



























1 ¬ ￿ ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)￿
￿ ¬ ￿￿

Similar to the condition in equation (10), we also assume that
￿(1 ¬ ￿ ¬ (1 ¬ ￿)￿)

















The government budget constraint is given by

￿ =




Note that we assumed that the countries are identical except for the
productivity parameter. This is why we wrote A* (instead of A) in
equation (18), but we used the same symbols for all other parameters.
Note also that the tax rate is a policy country-speci￿c variable, so that
we employ di⁄erent symbols, ￿ and ￿￿, for the host and source country,
respectively.
3.3 Migrant Supply
Each resident in the source country, skilled or unskilled, decides whether
to migrate to the host country or stay in her source country, depending
on where her utility is higher (taking into account migration costs).
Consider ￿rst a skilled resident with migration cost of ￿. If she stays in
her source country, her utility level is (￿￿￿￿). If she migrates to the
host country she enjoys a utility level of (￿￿￿)¬￿. Thus, there will
be a cuto⁄ level of the cost, denoted by b 
￿such that all skilled persons
with ￿ below b ￿
 will migrate and all others stay behind. The cuto⁄level
of the cost is given by:
(￿
￿￿￿) = (￿￿￿) ¬ b 
￿
 (19)
8Given the uniform distribution of b ￿
 over the interval [0￿] the num-
ber of skilled migrants () is then given by




Similarly, for the unskilled too there will be a cuto⁄ level of the
migration cost, denoted by b ￿
 which is given by
(￿
￿￿￿) = (￿￿￿) ¬ b 
￿
 (21)
The number or unskilled migrants (), is then given by




Hence, the total number of migrants (￿), is given by
￿ =  +  = (b 
￿




and the share of the skilled migrants in the total migration is given
by
￿ = ( + ) (24)
3.4 Fiscal and Migration Competition
Each one of the two countries independently determines its tax-bene￿t
policy ((￿) and (￿￿￿)) by majority voting. That is, the policy is de-
termined by maximization of the (indirect) utility function of the skilled
or the unskilled, depending on which of the two groups forms a major-
ity. In doing so, voters in each country take the tax-bene￿t policy of the
other country as given (Nash-equilibrium).
Note that we assume that the host country is more productive than
the source country, that is,   ￿. This productivity advantage is the
driver of migration ￿ ows from the source country to the host country in
our stylized model.
The indirect utility functions in equilibrium of the skilled and the

























9The per-capita bene￿t (public service) in equilibrium is given by:










Similarly, the source-country indirect utility functions in equilibrium
















































The migration (incentive compatible) equations are:
(￿
￿;
￿) = (￿;) ¬ ^ 
￿
 (31)






￿) = (￿;) ¬ ^ 
￿
 (33)




Finally, the de￿nitions of ￿ and ￿ are:





Equations (31)-(34) determine the volume and skill composition of
migration when the later is free. Alternatively, the host country adopt
an active migration policy by which it directly controls  and .
10However, as migration can not be "forced" by the host country to come,
these levels of  and  can not exceed their free-migration level. Thus,
equation (32) and (34) should be replaced by inequalities









respectively. In the remainder of this paper we assume that in the
migration-controlled regime the inequalities are npt binding and simply
drop equations (31)-(34) for this regime.
We now turn to the analysis of the ￿scal-competition problem, with
and without free migration.
3.5 Nash Equilibrium of the Policy Game
Consider ￿rst the case of conrolled migration. To ￿x ideas we consider
the case where the skilled are in the majority in both the source and the
host countries. Each country chooses its policy variables assuming that
the other country￿ s variables are given (Nash-equilibrium).
Formally, the Nash-equilibrium is as follows:
(I) The host country solves the given following optimization problem:
Maxf;￿;b;￿;￿;g
subject to equations (25), (27), (35) and (36)
(II) The source country solves the following optimization problem:
Maxf;￿￿￿g
subject to equations (26) and (30)
Note that this formulation assumes that the host-country regulates
directly immigration, but the source country does not. Note that it is
technically impossible for the two countries to a⁄ect independently the
same migration policy. More importantly, we chose the host country as
the one that controls migration, because it is more common for voters
to engage in setting immigration policies than emigration policies.
A Nash-equilibrium is the solution to (I) and (II) above.
We ￿rst compare in the next section these equilibrium policies, (with
controlled migration) with the policies that will ensue in the absence of
migration; that is, when ￿ is set exogenously at zero. We carry this
comparison via numerical simulations.
Another regime that we study is where migration is free. In this case,
the host country￿ s optimization problem (I) changes to:
11(I￿ ) The host country solves the given following optimization problem:
Maxf;￿g
subject to equations (25) and (27)
The optimization problem of the source country (II) does not change.
The equilibrium is given by (I￿ ), (II), and in addition, the free migration
equations (31) - (36) determine the migration variables ￿￿;^ ￿

and ^ ￿
. We study this free-migration regeme and compare it to the
controlled migration regime in section 5.
4 The identity of the Decisive Voter and Fiscal and
Migration Competition: Controlled Migration
Consider ￿rst the case where the skilled are the majority (in both coun-
tries). As the productivity gap rises, the skilled majority in the host
country opts to raise the volume of migration, and to decrease the share
of skilled migrants. This is because the rise in the productivity gap
strengthens the positive e⁄ect on the marginal productivity of all com-
plementary inputs (unskilled labor) and generates also strong negative
e⁄ects on the marginal productivity of all competing inputs (skilled la-
bor). Things are di⁄erent in the case where the unskilled are the ma-
jority (in both countries). As the productivity gap rises, the unskilled
majority in the host country opts for a larger share of skilled among the
migrants, and also a larger volume of migration.
Figures 1 and 2 describe the e⁄ect of a rise in the productivity gap
and of migration on the tax rates and per-capita bene￿ts, respectively,
in the two countries for the case in which the skilled are in the majority
(in both countries). Note that the host-country has a lower tax rate with
a larger per-capita bene￿t, compared to the source-country, thanks to
its productivity advantage. In other words, the productivity advantage
implies that the host country can provide more generous bene￿ts than
the source country with a smaller tax rate.
12Figure 1: The e⁄ect of the productivity gap and migration on the source- and
host-country taxes; The skilled are the majority
13Figure 2: The e⁄ect of the productivity gap and migration on the source- and
host-country per-capita bene￿t; The skilled are the majority
Consider now the e⁄ect of an increase in the host-source productivity,
holding the source-country productivity ￿xed, thereby raising the pro-
ductivity gap. Tax rates in both the host and the source country fall.
From Figure 2 we can see that the host-country bene￿ts rise whereas the
source-country bene￿ts fall.
Comparing the migration with the no migration case, Figure 1 shows
that migration raises the host-country tax rate, whereas it lowers the
source-country tax rate. This is an unexpected result in view of the
literature (see e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1990)). As far as the generosity of
the welfare state is concerned, comparing again the migration and the no
migration cases, Figure 2 shows that migration raises the host-country
bene￿ts but lowers the source-country bene￿ts, as expected in view of
the behavior of the tax rates.
14Figure 3: The e⁄ect of the productivity gap and migration on the source- and
host-country taxes; The unskilled are the majority.
15Figure 4: The e⁄ect of the productivity gap and migration on the source- and
host-country taxes; The unskilled are the majority.
Figures 3 and 4 describe the e⁄ect of the productivity gap and mi-
gration on the tax rates and per-capita bene￿ts, respectively, in the two
countries for the case in which the unskilled are in the majority (in both
the host and the source country).
Note that as in the case where the skilled are in the majority, the host-
country has a lower tax rate and higher per-capita bene￿t, compared to
the source-country, thanks to e⁄ect of productivity on political-economy
based tax rate.
Consider now the e⁄ect of an increase in the productivity gap de-
scribed in Figures 3 and 4. As the host-country productivity advantage
rises, the tax rate in the host country falls as in the case where the
skilled where the majority. But now the tax rate in the source-country
rises rather then falls. From Figure 4 we can see that as the host-country
productivity advantage rises, the host-country bene￿ts fall. As the tax
rate in the source country rises, so do the bene￿ts.
Comparing the migration with the no-migration cases, Figure 3 shows
16that migration lowers the host-country tax rate, as is indeed expected in
view of the literature on factors mobility. However, in contrast to this
literature, the tax rate in the source country is higher under migration
than without migration. As far as the generosity of the welfare state is
concerned, Figure 4 shows that the bene￿ts behave in circumstance to
the tax rates. As expected, the host country tax rate falls if migration
is allowed because the native-born are reluctant to set high taxes, as
the proceeds of these taxes serve to ￿nance also bene￿ts to immigrants
("￿scal leakage"), as in Razin and Sadka (2002a) and (2002b).
5 Free vs. Controlled Migration
In the previous sections migration is assumed to be controlled by the
host country. In this section we analyze the case of free migration. We
compare the di⁄erence between the tax policies of the host and source
country for the controlled and free migration regimes.
Figure 5 compares the host-country tax rates, under free and con-
trolled migration, for the case where the skilled-young is the largest
voting group. Similarly, Figure 6 compares the source-country tax rates,
under the controlled and free migration regimes, for the case where the
largest group is the skilled-young. If the skilled-young is the largest
group, the regime switch from free to controlled migration raises the
tax rate in the host country, while it lowers the tax rate in the source
country.
Similarly, Figures 7 and 8 compare the two migration regimes for the
case where the unskilled-young is the largest voting group. In this case
the regime switch from free to controlled migration lowers the tax rate
in the host country and raises the tax rate in the source country.
Therefore, the ability to control migration a⁄ects the tax rates in the
host and source countries di⁄erently. The tax e⁄ect crucially depends
on which skill group is decisive.
17Figure 5: comparing the host-country tax rates under free and under controlled
migration; Largest groups are the Skilled-Young
18Figure 6: comparing the source-country tax rates under free and under controlled
migration; Largest groups are the Skilled-Young
19Figure 7: comparing the host-country tax rates under free and under controlled
migration; Largest groups are the Unskilled-Young
20Figure 8: comparing the source-country tax rates under free and under controlled
migration; Largest groups are the Unskilled-Young
6 Conclusion
It is often argued that tax competition may lead to a "race to the bot-
tom". This result may indeed hold in the case of factor mobility (such
as capital). However, in this paper we emphasize the unique feature of
labor migration, that may nullify the"race to the bottom" hypothesis.
Labor migration is governed not only by net-of-tax factor rewards, but
rather importantly also by the bene￿ts that the welfare state provides.
Taking this consideration into account, countries are less reluctant to
impose taxes that ￿nance bene￿ts to their residents in the presence of
migration. Employing simulation methods we can indeed demonstrate
that migration need not lower taxes in the source country, and may even
give rise to higher taxes.
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